La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2022.31.1.1

Palabras clave:

Reforma constitucional inconstitucional, revisión constitucional, formalismo, Francia, Georgia, Turquía

Resumen

Numerosas cortes en todo el mundo han evaluado o ejercido la facultad para invalidar una reforma constitucional. Sin embargo, no debemos tomar la creciente prevalencia de la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional como evidencia de su conveniencia para todos los Estados constitucionales. Es imperativo que los actores constitucionales comprendan que hay otra respuesta a la pregunta sobre si una reforma puede ser inconstitucional. Este artículo tiene tres objetivos y tratamos de cumplir cada uno de ellos con referencia a tres jurisdicciones específicas, Francia, Georgia y Turquía, cuyas constituciones y prácticas constitucionales concomitantes han rechazado expresamente esta teoría de una manera que refleja lo que describimos como una resistencia formalista común a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales. En primer lugar, pretendemos demostrar que la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional aún no ha madurado lo suficiente como para convertirse en una norma de constitucionalismo global. También procuramos explicar cómo opera una jurisdicción que rechaza expresamente la idea de una reforma constitucional inconstitucional frente a una reforma que, en otras circunstancias, sería invalidada por ser inconstitucional en una jurisdicción donde sí fuese aceptada la teoría. Por último, buscamos evaluar lo que se gana y lo que se pierde en un Estado constitucional cuando se rechaza esta teoría. Uno de los hallazgos es que la decisión de rechazar esta teoría tiene consecuencias tanto de fortalecimiento como de debilitamiento para la democracia. Nuestro propósito más amplio es inherente a nuestra investigación en sí misma: diversificar nuestro pensamiento sobre el riesgo que se corre al considerar la aceptación de la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional como una característica necesaria del constitucionalismo, cuando el diseño y la práctica constitucional muestran claramente lo contrario.

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Publicado

2022-06-16

Cómo citar

Albert, R., Nakashidze, M., & Olcay, T. (2022). La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales. Díkaion, 31(1), 5–49. https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2022.31.1.1

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Piezas Maestras para Lectores Hispanos