Resistência formalista às reformas constitucionais inconstitucionais
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2022.31.1.1Palavras-chave:
Reforma constitucional inconstitucional, revisão constitucional, formalismo, França, Geórgia, TurquiaResumo
Inúmeras cortes em todo o mundo vêm avaliando ou exercendo a faculdade para desvalidar uma reforma constitucional. Contudo, não devemos tomar a crescente prevalência da teoria da reforma constitucional inconstitucional como evidência de sua conveniência para todos os Estados constitucionais. É imperativo que os atores constitucionais compreendam que há outra resposta à pergunta sobre se uma reforma pode ser inconstitucional. Este artigo tem três objetivos e tratamos de cumprir cada um deles com referência a três jurisdições específicas: França, Geórgia e Turquia, cujas constituições e práticas constitucionais concomitantes rejeitam expressamente essa teoria de uma maneira que reflete o que descrevemos como resistência formalista comum às reformas constitucionais inconstitucionais. Em primeiro lugar, pretendemos demonstrar que a teoria da reforma constitucional inconstitucional ainda não amadureceu suficientemente para se tornar uma norma de constitucionalismo global. Além disso, buscamos explicar como uma jurisdição que rejeita expressamente a ideia de uma reforma constitucional inconstitucional opera diante de uma reforma que, em outras circunstâncias, seria invalidada por ser inconstitucional numa jurisdição onde sim a teoria fosse aceita. Por último, pretendemos avaliar o que se ganha e o que se perde num Estado constitucional quando essa teoria é rejeitada. Constata-se que a decisão de rejeitar essa teoria tem consequências tanto de fortalecimento quanto de enfraquecimento para a democracia. Nosso objetivo maior é inerente a nossa pesquisa em si: diversificar nosso pensamento sobre o risco que se corre ao considerar aceitar a teoria da reforma constitucional inconstitucional como uma característica necessária do constitucionalismo, quando o desenho e a prática constitucional mostram claramente o contrário.
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