El maniaco del unísono. Una crítica al positivismo por su reduccionismo epistemológico

Abstract

All along human history, it can be observed the constant oscillation between different scientific theories. This can be proved, for example, by reflecting on the evolution of some philosophic ideas since the end of the middle Ages up to the present time. Moreover, this phenomenon brings to the surface a basic characteristic of human condition: insecurity. One, which generates the option for simplistic and “pure” solutions, and culminates, in many cases, in a defective approach to reality.

The scientific problem which states epistemological reductionism is that, as it omits the existential dimension of human life, is incapable to give satisfactory answers to resolve conflicts.

This fault is suffered by legal positivism –in the same way that naïf iusnaturalism, before– because of its impossibility to resolve real legal conflicts. Impossibility, that finds it roots in a pretended non-valorative approach, and gives place to two kinds of reductionism: the one which ignores sharply the valuations and the other that recognizing them, but arbitrarily chooses the values (or “the value”) object of its knowledge.