Conduct as a Configurating Element in the Concept of Law: The Scope of its Application as the First Analogue in Practical Philosophy

Abstract

Research on the concept of law implies taking into account the existenceof multiple epistemological models. It is important not only to understandthis epistemological dispersion at the philosophical level of the law, legalscience and the classification of knowledge; it also directly involves consideringthe polysemy of the concept of law. In natural law in general, thiselucidation implies broaching the relationships that exist between justiceand the different components of the legal world. At present, that relationshipbetween justice and law has given rise to numerous explanations.

For Rodolfo Vigo, the concept of law can be understood as the relationshipbetween two or more persons pursuant to what Finance proposed. On theother hand, Vigo himself suggests that some authors, such as Suarez,maintain the concept of law can be defended in its most reliable sense assubjective law. This also could refer to the just or fair proportion of assetsthat are distributed among the members of a society, pursuant to M. Villey,or ultimately to opting for the constructing a definition based on thefocal meaning of the law, as J.Finnis does in his work.The purpose of this article is to show how, in the new natural law, the relationshipis of the same substance or inseparable from justice, since thenotion of what is fair or just is directly related to the person, as inscribedin the philosophy of being.

Specifically, in the work of Massini, humanconduct stands out as the first analogue of the concept of law, a situationthat implies not only an organization of the levels in the legal world, butalso practical effects in the decisions to be adopted.