Fundamentos bíblicos de la separación de poderes y función catalizadora del juez

Carlos Bernal Pulido

doi:10.5294/dika.2019.28.2.1

Autores

Carlos Bernal Pulido Autor Corte Constitucional de Colombia http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1310-8398

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2019.28.2.1

Palavras-chave:

Separação de poderes, constitucionalismo, supremacia judicial, função judicial, fundamentos cristãos da separação de poderes

Resumo

Biblical Foundations for the Separation of Powers and the Catalysing Function of Judges

Fundamentos bíblicos da separação de poderes e a função catalisadora do juiz

Este artigo argumenta que a Bíblia fundamenta o princípio de separação de poderes. A partir de uma reconstrução conceitual da noção de “separação de poderes”, este trabalho defende a tese de que as Escrituras atribuem aos juízes a função de incentivar as autoridades políticas a agirem de forma virtuosa para proteger os direitos e os interesses das pessoas. As conclusões deste artigo são de suma relevância para sustentar uma concepção que incentiva os juízes a exercerem uma função catalisadora a fim de que as autoridades políticas efetivamente protejam os direitos e os interesses das pessoas mediante a criação de direito e a formulação de políticas públicas.

Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo

Carlos Bernal-Pulido, “Fundamentos bíblicos de la separación de poderes y función catalizadora del juez”, en Dikaion 28, 2 (2019), 222-246. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2019.28.2.1

Recibido: 17/07/2019

Aceptado: 15/08/2019

Publicado: 24/10/2019

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Biografia do Autor

Carlos Bernal Pulido, Corte Constitucional de Colombia

Magistrado de Corte Constitucional de Colombia

Dr. en Filosofía (U. de Florida)

Dr. en Derecho (U. de Salamanca)

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