El estado del derecho constitucional comparado: ¿para qué son las constituciones?

Joel I. Colón-Ríos

doi:10.5294/dika.2022.31.2.13

Autores

Joel I. Colón-Ríos Autor Victoria University of Wellington https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2733-3246

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2022.31.2.13

Palavras-chave:

Direito constitucional comparado, teoria constitucional, democracia, autogoverno

Resumo

Neste artigo, busca-se mostrar que uma parte importante da literatura contemporânea, geralmente classificada como “direito constitucional comparado”, opera sob uma concepção da natureza das constituições que se encontra em tensão com a democracia ou, mais especificamente, com o que denomino “teoria constitucional democrática”. Para defender esse argumento, são examinados alguns trabalhos de figuras importantes nessa disciplina, incluindo Rosalind Dixon, David Landau, Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq e Richard Albert, com o objetivo de identificar as formas com as quais reproduzem, explícita ou implicitamente, um ponto de vista particular sobre o que as constituições deveriam fazer. Esse ponto de vista, o que pode ser identificado como “liberal”, é caracterizado por entender as constituições, ante tudo, como mecanismos para limitar o poder político. O resultado são trabalhos que refletem o que chamo “problemas de pontos cegos”, de minimização da democracia, de esterilização do conflito político e de ausência de materialidade. No entanto, o limitar o exercício do poder político não é o único propósito atribuível a uma constituição; da perspectiva de uma teoria constitucional democrática, uma constituição se entenderia como um mecanismo dirigido a facilitar o autogoverno popular. Este artigo está dividido em três partes. Na primeira, é identificado o âmbito do que entendo por “teoria constitucional” e são comparadas as formas dominantes de teorização liberais com aquelas que são mais democráticas. Na segunda parte, é argumentado que, ao operar sob a abordagem liberal, o direito constitucional comparado frequentemente sofre dos quatro problemas identificados anteriormente. Por último, é oferecida uma breve reflexão sobre a possível democratização da disciplina.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Referências

Albert, Richard, Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190640484.001.0001

Albert, Richard, “Haiti should relinquish its sovereignty”, Boston Globe, 2 de mayo de 2017.

Ali Nunzio y Luigi Caranti, “How much economic inequality if fair in liberal democracies? The approach of proportional justice”, Philosophy and Social Criticism 47 (2021). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453720987865

Balkin, Jack, The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197530993.001.0001

Barber, N. W., The Principles of Constitutionalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198808145.003.0001

Colón-Ríos, Joel, Constituent Power and the Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198785989.001.0001

Colón-Ríos, Joel, “Primary assemblies, constituent power, and the imperative mandate”, en Hanna Lerner y David Landau (eds.), Elgar Handbook of Comparative Constitution-Making, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2019.

Colón-Ríos, Joel, Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power, Abingdon-on-Thames, Routledge, 2012. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203120132

Dalton Russel, J., David M. Farrell e Ian McAllister, Political Parties Democratic Linkage: How Parties Organize Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199599356.001.0001

Daly, Tom, “Democratic decay: Conceptualising an emerging research field”, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 11 (2019). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-019-00086-2

de Dijn Annelien, Freedom: An Unruly History, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674245617

Dugard, Jackie, Bruce Porter, Daniela Ikawa y Lilian Chenwi (eds.), Research Handbook on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788974172

Dworkin, Ronald, Is Democracy Possible Here: Principles for a New Political Debate, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400827275

Eberhardt, María Laura, “Crisis de representación en las democracias presidencialistas latinoamericanas: ¿la revocatoria de mandato como opción?”, Elecciones 12 (2013). DOI: https://doi.org/10.53557/Elecciones.2013.v12n13.01

Estrada, Miguel A., “Honduras’ Non-Coup”, Los Angeles Times, 10 de julio de 2009.

Feldman Noah, David Landau, Brian Sheppard y Leonidas Rosa Suazo, “Reporte a la Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación de Honduras: Asuntos Constitucionales (19 de marzo de 2011).

Galligan, D. J., “The paradox of constitutionalism or the potential of constitutional theory”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqn007

Gargarella, Roberto, Latin American Constitutionalism 1810-2010: The Engine Room of the Constitution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199937967.001.0001

Gargarella, Roberto, Law as a Conversation Among Equals, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009105682

Ginsburg, Tom, “The machinery of international law and democratic backsliding: The problem of term limits”, Law & Ethics of Human Rights 14 (2020). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2020-2012

Ginsburg, Tom y Aziz Z. Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.001.0001

Godden, Andrew y John Morison, “Constitutionalism”, en Rainer Grote, Frauke Lachenmann y Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/law-mpeccol/e9.013.9

Goldoni, Marco y Michael A. Wilkinson, “The material constitution”, The Modern Law Review 81 (2018).

Griffin, Stephen M., “Constitutional theory transformed”, Yale Law Journal 108 (1999). DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/797384

Grimm Dieter, Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/97801987 66124.001.0001

Khaitan, Tarunabh, “Balancing accountability and effectiveness: A case for moderated parliamentarism”, Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law 7 (2021). DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3762507

Lacey, Marc, “Leader’s ouster not a coup, says the honduran military”, New York Times, 1 de julio de 2009.

Landau, David y Rosalind Dixon, “Abusive judicial review: Courts against democracy”, University of California, Davis 53 (2020).

Landemore, Hélène, Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691181998.001.0001

Langston, Joy K., Democratization and Authoritarian Party Survival: Mexico’s PRI, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190628512.001.0001

Lewis, Emma, “The Caribbean Court of Justice loses again: This time with voter apathy and distrust”, Global Voices, 13 de noviembre de 2018.

Lindstaedt, Natasha, Democratic Decay and Authoritarian Resurgence, Bristol, Bristol University Press, 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.51952/9781529210408

Loughlin, Martin, “Constitutional theory: A 25th anniversary essay”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (2005). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqi010

Marshall, Geoffrey, Constitutional Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980.

Moyn, Samuel, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674984806

Negretto, Gabriel L., “Tinkering with executive term limits: Partisan imbalances and institutional legacies in Latin America”, Democratization 29 (2021). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1980539

O’Connell, Paul y Umut Özsu (eds.), Research Handbook in Law and Marxism, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12352

Oklopcic, Zoran, “The illiberal potential of the people”, en András Sajó, Renáta Uitz y Stephen Holmes (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, Abingdon-on-Thames, Routledge, 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367260569-18

Roznai, Yaniv, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198768791.001.0001

Sachs, Albie, “Enforcement of social and economic rights”, American University International Law Review 22 (2006).

Sajó, András, Ruling by Cheating: Governance in Illiberal Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108952996

Schumpeter Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, Harper & Row, 1942.

Schütze, Robert, “Constitutionalism”, en Roger Masterman y Robert Schütze (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Constitutional Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316716731.003

Sultany, Nimer, “Marx and critical constitutional theory”, en Paul O’Connell y Umut Özsu (eds.), Research Handbook in Law and Marxism, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2021.

Thomassen, Jacques (ed.), Elections and Democracy: Representation and Accountability, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716334.001.0001

Tierney, Stephen, The Federal Contract: A Constitutional Theory of Federalism (documento inédito en el archivo del autor).

Tushnet, Mark y Bojan Bugaric, Power to the People: Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197606711.001.0001

Urbinati, Nadia, Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 2014. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674726383

Van Reybrouck, David, Against Elections: The Case for Democracy, London, The Bodley Head, 2016.

Velasco-Rivera, Mariana, “Constitutional rigidity: The mexican experiment”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 19 (2021). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moab087

Verdugo, Sergio, “How can constitutional review experiments fail? Lessons from the 1925 Constitution”, International Journal of Constitutional Law 19 (2021). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moab074

Versteeg, Mila, Timothy Horley, Anne Meng, Mauricio Guim y Marilyn Guirguis, “The law and politics of presidential term limit evasion”, Columbia Law Review 120 (2020).

Welp, Yanina y Laurence Whitehead, “The recall revival and its mixed implications for democracy: Evidence from Latin America”, en Yanina Welp y Laurence Whitehead (eds.), The Politics of Recall Elections, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37610-9

Young, Katherine G., The Future of Economic and Social Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019.