O Estado de direito constitucional comparado: para que são as constituições?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5294/dika.2022.31.2.13Palavras-chave:
Direito constitucional comparado, teoria constitucional, democracia, autogovernoResumo
Neste artigo, busca-se mostrar que uma parte importante da literatura contemporânea, geralmente classificada como “direito constitucional comparado”, opera sob uma concepção da natureza das constituições que se encontra em tensão com a democracia ou, mais especificamente, com o que denomino “teoria constitucional democrática”. Para defender esse argumento, são examinados alguns trabalhos de figuras importantes nessa disciplina, incluindo Rosalind Dixon, David Landau, Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq e Richard Albert, com o objetivo de identificar as formas com as quais reproduzem, explícita ou implicitamente, um ponto de vista particular sobre o que as constituições deveriam fazer. Esse ponto de vista, o que pode ser identificado como “liberal”, é caracterizado por entender as constituições, ante tudo, como mecanismos para limitar o poder político. O resultado são trabalhos que refletem o que chamo “problemas de pontos cegos”, de minimização da democracia, de esterilização do conflito político e de ausência de materialidade. No entanto, o limitar o exercício do poder político não é o único propósito atribuível a uma constituição; da perspectiva de uma teoria constitucional democrática, uma constituição se entenderia como um mecanismo dirigido a facilitar o autogoverno popular. Este artigo está dividido em três partes. Na primeira, é identificado o âmbito do que entendo por “teoria constitucional” e são comparadas as formas dominantes de teorização liberais com aquelas que são mais democráticas. Na segunda parte, é argumentado que, ao operar sob a abordagem liberal, o direito constitucional comparado frequentemente sofre dos quatro problemas identificados anteriormente. Por último, é oferecida uma breve reflexão sobre a possível democratização da disciplina.
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