A Right to Happiness?

Abstract

A "right to happiness" has been proposed as part of third generation human rights. This study takes a critical look at the intelligibility of a fundamental right of this sort, arguing that a gross distinction can be made between "internalist" and "externalist" ideas of happiness. Internalist ideas hold that happiness requires free action. Externalist ideas hold that happiness can be achieved independent of the will of the person, simply by obtaining certain objects, circumstances or events. It is argued that a right to happiness makes no sense in light of either of these interpretations, since it is impossible to comply universally with an "externalist" right to happiness. The state can only make someone "happy" at the expense of the happiness of others. Conversely, a right to happiness according to the internalist interpretation is impossible as well, simply because there is nothing a state or a third party can do to replace the free action of a person.